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Using survey data on interpersonal influence behavior 
from a large sample of managers and chief executive offi 
cers (CEOs) at Forbes 500 companies, we examine how 
ingratiatory behavior directed at individuals who control 
access to board positions can provide an alternative path 
way to the boardroom for managers who lack the social 
and educational credentials associated with the power 
elite. Findings show that top managers who engage in 
ingratiatory behavior toward their CEO, with ingratiation 
comprising flattery, opinion conformity, and favor-render 
ing, will be more likely to receive board appointments at 
other firms where their CEO serves as director and at 
boards to which the CEO is indirectly connected in the 
board interlock network. Further results suggest that 
interpersonal influence behavior substitutes to some 
degree for the advantages of an elite background or 
demographic majority status. Our findings help explain 
why norms of director deference to CEOs have persisted 
despite increased diversity in the corporate elite and have 
implications for research on corporate governance, social 
networks in the corporate elite, and for the sociological 
question of whether demographic minorities and individ 
uals who lack privileged backgrounds have equal access 
to positions of leadership in large U.S. companies. Our 
study ultimately suggests that such individuals face a 
rather subtle and perhaps unexpected form of social dis 
crimination, in that they must engage in a higher level of 
interpersonal influence behavior in order to have the 
same chance of obtaining a board appointment.* 
Normative perspectives on corporate governance, in both 
academic and popular discourse, have long maintained that 
boards of directors have the potential to serve a critical role 
in protecting the interests of stakeholders of large corpora 
tions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Outside or "independent" 
directors, in particular, are expected to monitor and control 
management decision making on behalf of stakeholders 
(Demsetz, 1983). A majority of outside directors at large com 
panies are themselves top managers of other large organiza 
tions, so they should have valuable information and expertise 
to contribute to strategic decision making. Moreover, 
because they are formally independent of and hierarchically 
superior to management, they should be well positioned to 
evaluate management decision making objectively and force 
needed changes in corporate strategy or management per 
sonnel, fulfilling their legal obligation to oversee corporate 
strategy on behalf of shareholders (Black, 1998). Yet research 
suggests that widespread social norms for directors' behavior 
often prevent corporate boards from fully exercising their 
control function on behalf of stakeholders' interests (e.g., 
Davis and Thompson, 1994; Domhoff, 2002; Westphal and 
Khanna, 2003; for a review, see Mizruchi, 2004). A long line 
of research in organization theory and the sociology of corpo 
rate elites has provided qualitative evidence, as well as quan 
titative evidence from surveys of corporate elites, indicating 
that outside directors of large companies, and especially 
directors who also serve as senior managers of other large 
firms, abide by social norms in which they tend to defer to 
the chief executive officer's (CEO's) judgment on strategic 
issues and to respect the CEO's decision-making authority 
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and autonomy. In a multimethod study that combined large 
sample survey data with qualitative data from field inter 
views, Westphal and Khanna (2003: 361) found that directors 
who participated in actions that limited managerial autonomy 
at a particular firm, such as making changes in board struc 
ture that reduced the CEO's control over decision making, 
experienced "social distancing" from directors at other firms: 
they were less likely to be invited to informal meetings, their 
input and advice was solicited less often, and others were 
less likely to build on their comments, suggesting that board 
control over management violated social norms of directors' 
conduct, resulting in social sanctions. Earlier studies by Vogel 
(1978), Useem (1984), Davis and Thompson (1994), and oth 
ers suggested that such normative expectations not only 
restrain directors from exercising control over CEOs but also 
unite them against external threats to managerial autonomy 
from institutional investors or government legislation. 
Norms of directors deferring to top managers are thought to 
have persisted despite external pressure on boards to exert 
greater control over management in large part because of 
social cohesion among the "inner circle" of corporate elites, 
those individuals, including manager-directors, who serve in 
leadership positions at multiple large firms (Mills, 1956; 
Useem, 1984; Ratcliffe, 1987; Burris, 2001; Domhoff, 2002). 
From this perspective, social cohesion strengthens norms by 
facilitating the socialization of new directors and the social 
control of deviant behavior (Domhoff, 1978, 2002; Palmer, 
1987; Westphal and Khanna, 2003). The social cohesion of 
the inner circle, in turn, has been attributed to high levels of 
demographic homogeneity, combined with common social 
ties, shared attitudes, and compatible behavioral styles that 
result from attendance at the same elite educational institu 
tions, membership in exclusive social clubs, and shared 
upper-class backgrounds (Koenig and Gogel, 1981; Useem, 
1984; Palmer, 1987; Burris, 1991; Palmerand Barber, 2001; 
Domhoff, 2002). 
Accordingly, the literature on corporate elites suggests that 
persistent norms of conduct for directors, including norms of 
deferring to CEOs, can ultimately be traced to director-selec 
tion processes that tend to restrict entry into the corporate 
elite to demographically similar individuals who share certain 
elite social and educational credentials. Qualitative research 
by Domhoff and colleagues (Domhoff, 2002; Zweigenhaft 
and Domhoff, 1998), as well as recent large-sample quantita 
tive research by Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002), sug 
gests that ethnic minorities and women are generally disad 
vantaged in obtaining board positions at large firms. 
Moreover, Useem and Karabel (1986) found strong evidence 
that managers are more likely to obtain board appointments if 
they have elite social and educational credentials, such as a 
degree from an elite college or Master's of Business Admin 
istration (MBA) program, membership in a prestigious social 
club, or indications of upper-class status, such as listing in 
the Social Register. 
At the same time, although managers who have elite social 
and educational credentials have an advantage in gaining 
access to board positions, many managers obtain board 
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Interpersonal Influence Behavior 
seats without such credentials. As Useem and Karabei (1986: 
198) acknowledged, "... there is nothing in the study's 
results to suggest that a social or academic elite monopolizes 
the ascent into the highest levels of the corporate world.... 
[The inner circle of board members] includes a significant 
number of individuals of non-elite origins" (see also Domhoff, 
2002: 63). And the portion of board seats held by managers 
who lack elite social and educational backgrounds has 
increased over time (Domhoff, 2002). Similarly, although eth 
nic minorities and women are clearly underrepresented on 
corporate boards, their representation has increased signifi 
cantly in recent years (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998). 
Accordingly, this literature leaves two interrelated questions 
unanswered. First, if demographic minorities and managers 
who lack elite credentials are disadvantaged in gaining 
access to board positions, how do significant numbers of 
such managers nevertheless ascend to the corporate board 
room? And second, if demographic homogeneity and com 
mon elite backgrounds among the inner circle of corporate 
leaders help to sustain widespread norms of conduct for 
directors, including norms of deferring to CEOs, why would 
the growing presence on boards of minority directors and 
managers who lack elite backgrounds not alter or weaken 
such norms? In this study, we directly address the first ques 
tion, and in the process, we indirectly address the second. 
We draw on social psychological theory and research on 
interpersonal influence in suggesting that interpersonal influ 
ence behavior, in the form of ingratiatory behavior directed at 
CEOs, may provide an alternative pathway to the corporate 
boardroom for managers who lack the advantages of elite 
social and educational credentials or demographic majority 
status. We expect that ingratiatory behavior by top managers 
toward the CEO of their company will increase the likelihood 
that managers will receive board appointments at other firms 
by increasing the CEO's propensity to recommend them for 
board seats and that interpersonal influence behavior will 
substitute to some degree for the advantages of an elite 
background or demographic majority status, such that ingrati 
ation toward the CEO will be particularly beneficial in garner 
ing board appointments for managers who lack such cre 
dentials. 
An implication of our theory is that norms of directors defer 
ring to CEOs may persist in part because managers who 
tend to be deferential or submissive toward CEOs are more 
likely to receive board seats. Moreover, although the appoint 
ment of managers with unconventional backgrounds or 
demographic profiles might be expected to weaken norms of 
deference toward CEOs, our theory suggests that such man 
agers must typically have been especially deferential or sub 
missive toward CEOs in order to receive a board appoint 
ment. Thus our theory implies that the presence of 
demographically different managers on boards may not 
weaken norms of deference but may even strengthen them. 
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INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR AS A PATHWAY 
TO THE BOARDROOM 
Ingratiation and Board Appointments 
Ingratiation can be defined as a pattern of interpersonal influ 
ence behavior that serves to "enhance one's interpersonal 
attractiveness" or "gain favor" with another person (Kumar 
and Beyerlein, 1991: 619). An extensive literature in social 
psychology suggests that ingratiation comprises three dis 
tinct behaviors: opinion conformity, or verbal statements that 
validate an opinion held by another person, other-enhance 
ment or flattery, and favor rendering (Jones, 1964; Tedeschi 
and Melburg, 1984; Gordon, 1996). Laboratory and field 
research in organizational behavior has linked the use of 
these tactics to a wide range of beneficial outcomes, includ 
ing favorable performance evaluations, higher salary increas 
es, and faster career advancement (Kumar and Beyerlein, 
1991; Gordon, 1996; Westphal, 1998; Higgins, Judge, and 
Ferris, 2003). Reviews of this literature, including a meta 
analysis of 69 studies, have generally concluded that ingratia 
tion has positive and fairly robust effects on ratings of like 
ability and outcomes related to career success (e.g., 
recommendations for promotion) and significant though 
somewhat weaker effects on evaluations of performance or 
competence (Gordon, 1996; Higgins, Judge, and Ferris, 
2003). Although earlier work on ingratiation included self-pro 
motion or 
"self-presentation" as a kind of ingratiatory behav 
ior (Jones, 1964), contemporary perspectives on interperson 
al influence generally treat self-promotion as a distinct 
construct (Jones and Pittman, 1982; Godfrey, Jones, and 
Lord, 1986; Ellis et al., 2002). Whereas ingratiation tactics 
serve to enhance interpersonal attractiveness, and may influ 
ence performance judgments only indirectly, self-promotion 
involves direct attempts to influence judgments of perfor 
mance or competence. Moreover, there is empirical evidence 
that indicators of self-promotion load on a different construct 
from indicators of other-enhancement, opinion conformity, 
and favor rendering (Stevens and Kristof, 1995; Harrison and 
Hochwarter, 1998), and self-promotion, compared with these 
other behaviors, is less consistently effective in enhancing 
the types of interpersonal influence (Godfrey, Jones, and 
Lord, 1986) that could lead to board appointments. 
Ingratiation by a subordinate toward a superior engenders 
positive affect for the subordinate and a feeling of indebted 
ness toward him or her, which leads to more tangible bene 
fits (Jones, 1964; Vonk, 1998, 2002). Other-enhancement 
induces liking through "the principle of reciprocal attraction" 
(Stevens and Kristof, 1995: 589). A basic tenet of theories of 
interpersonal behavior is that "people find it hard not to like 
those who think highly of them" (Heider, 1958; Jones, 1964: 
24), and a meta-analysis showed that other-enhancement has 
a strong, positive effect on judgments of interpersonal attrac 
tion (i.e., liking) (Gordon, 1996). Moreover, other-enhance 
ment can create interpersonal influence through social 
exchange. Based on the norm of reciprocity, when someone 
is 
"paid a compliment," he or she will feel socially obligated 
to return the favor (Vonk, 2002). For instance, studies have 
shown a strong tendency for people to reciprocate flattery by 
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making positive remarks about the ingratiator to a third per 
son (Jones and Wortman, 1973; Gordon, 1996). 
Opinion conformity engenders positive affect by triggering 
similarity-attraction bias. A long line of research in social psy 
chology and organizational behavior suggests that similarity in 
attitudes, values, and beliefs enhances interpersonal attrac 
tion (Byrne, Clore, and Worchel, 1966; Wayne and Liden, 
1995). Thus displays of opinion conformity should tend to 
promote positive affect and liking (Liden and Mitchell, 1988; 
Stevens and Kristof, 1995). Opinion conformity can also be 
viewed as an indirect form of flattery. In expressing agree 
ment with another's point of view, one validates his or her 
judgment. Accordingly, opinion conformity should not only 
enhance liking but should also engender a feeling of indebt 
edness toward the ingratiator. Ingratiation can also involve 
rendering more tangible, personal favors for another person, 
such as providing advice on a personal matter. This again cre 
ates influence by engendering positive affect and invoking 
norms of reciprocity, as the recipient feels socially and psy 
chologically obligated to return the personal favor (Jones and 
Wortman, 1973; Tedeschi and Melburg, 1984; Raven, 1999: 
166). 
As noted previously, ingratiation can be viewed as an act of 
submission or deference to another person. As Jones (1964: 
164) and others have proposed, ingratiatory behavior has the 
second-order effect of affirming the power of the influence 
target, which is itself a kind of other-enhancement (Shankar, 
Ansah, and Saxema, 1994; Vonk, 1998). People are attracted 
to others who affirm their power (Sadler and Woody, 2003). 
Thus ingratiatory behavior may engender liking even if the 
influence target recognizes it as ingratiation (Stevens and 
Kristof, 1995). As Jones (1964: 163) said, paraphrasing Emer 
son, "... we love flattery even though we are not deceived 
by it, because it shows that we are of importance enough to 
be courted." The deferential and submissive quality of ingrati 
ation should be especially likely to engender influence in con 
texts in which interpersonal trust is important, such as in top 
management teams (Kanter, 1977). Thus ingratiation of the 
CEO by a subordinate top manager should engender positive 
affect and a feeling of indebtedness toward the manager, 
increasing the likelihood that the CEO will favor the manager 
in allocating positive outcomes. One way a CEO could favor 
an ingratiating manager is to recommend him or her for a 
board seat at another company. 
Organizational research on ingratiation in superior-subordinate 
dyads has shown that ingratiatory behavior toward a superior 
can increase the likelihood of gaining positive recommenda 
tions or referrals for prestigious posts (Judge and Bretz, 
1994). CEOs have the greatest opportunity to influence board 
appointments in firms where they serve as an outside direc 
tor. Qualitative and survey research on director selection sug 
gests that CEO-directors, or outside directors who serve as 
the CEO of another company, have particular influence over 
the director selection process, as they are routinely called 
upon to recommend candidates for director appointments 
(Lorsch, 1989; Seidel and Westphal, 2004). There is some 
evidence that CEO-directors are routinely called upon to rec 
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ommend top managers who could replace them when they 
are expected to resign from a board (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992), and other evidence suggests that continuing CEO 
directors also routinely recommend candidates for open posi 
tions on these boards (Lorsch, 1989). 
Ingratiatory behavior may also reduce uncertainty about the 
manager's potential social fit on boards of large companies. 
Qualitative studies and recent large-sample survey research 
suggest that there are widespread normative sanctions 
against challenging or substantively questioning the CEO's 
position on the fundamental strategic direction of the compa 
ny (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Domhoff, 2002; Westphal 
and Khanna, 2003). As noted above, Westphal and Khanna 
(2003) found that directors who challenge management deci 
sion making on strategic issues tend to be informally sanc 
tioned by other directors. Although institutional investors 
have pressured outside directors to adopt a more controlling 
posture, Westphal and Khanna (2003) found that such pres 
sure has not weakened normative sanctions against challeng 
ing the CEO on strategic issues and may even have strength 
ened them as corporate leaders "close ranks" to protect 
their decision-making autonomy (also Davis and Thompson, 
1994; Domhoff, 2002: 32-35). Given normative expectations 
for directors' behavior, managers who display a tendency to 
conform to the opinion of their CEO on strategic issues, and 
who otherwise adopt a deferential posture toward the CEO, 
might be expected to fit in socially at boards of large compa 
nies. 
The ingratiation literature suggests that people who engage 
in submissive behavior toward higher-status others in one sit 
uation are likely to engage in such behavior in other situa 
tions (e.g., other groups or organizations). Social influence 
theorists have long contended that individual disposition is a 
significant determinant of ingratiatory behavior (cf. Liden and 
Mitchell, 1988; Kumar and Beyerlein, 1991; Barry and Wat 
son, 1996), and there is growing empirical evidence that cer 
tain personality traits, such as self-monitoring, predict the use 
of ingratiation (Farmer et al., 1993; Farmer and Maslyn, 1999; 
Cable and Judge, 2003). Moreover, individual disposition 
appears to determine ingratiatory behavior insofar as people 
tend to exhibit similar levels of ingratiation across situations 
in which their social status is similar to that of potential influ 
ence targets. While top managers do gain status when they 
become an outside director, in general the social status of 
outside directors is substantially lower than the status of 
CEOs of Forbes 500 companies. Thus managers who engage 
in ingratiation toward their CEO are also likely to be ingratiat 
ing to CEOs as an outside director. 
There is considerable evidence from the literature on man 
agement selection that social fit, or conformity to the norms 
of social interaction among top managers, is a primary criteri 
on of selection into management positions and/or promotion 
to higher levels of management (Kanter, 1977; Ferris, Young 
blood, and Yates, 1985; Kristof-Brown, 2000). By extension, 
social fit is likely to be an important criterion of selection onto 
corporate boards. Thus managers who reduce uncertainty 
about their potential social fit on boards of large companies 
174/ASQ, June 2006 
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by adopting a deferential or submissive posture toward the 
CEO may be more likely to receive recommendations for 
board appointments at other companies. This should be par 
ticularly important for top managers who lack board appoint 
ments, as opposed to those managers who already serve as 
outside directors, and whose first board appointment will 
admit them into the board interlock network. There is some 
evidence that elite social and educational credentials may be 
important determinants of admission into the board network 
but that, once admitted, a different set of factors may deter 
mine whether directors acquire additional appointments 
(Useem and Karabel, 1986; Davis, 1993). For instance, a man 
ager's behavior as outside director may influence the likeli 
hood that he or she will receive additional board appoint 
ments (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). 
CEO-directors' recommendations can influence board 
appointments in two ways. While recommending a manager 
to the nominating committee can obviously influence the like 
lihood that the manager will receive a board appointment at 
that company, it can also indirectly increase the manager's 
chances of receiving appointments at other firms. There is 
qualitative evidence that when a CEO-director recommends 
someone to the nominating committee, that name can 
spread through the board network as members of the nomi 
nating committee subsequently suggest the same person as 
a possible director candidate on other boards on which they 
serve as outside director (O'Neal and Thomas, 1996). Thus 
ingratiation toward the CEO can increase the likelihood of 
gaining appointments not only at companies where the CEO 
serves on the board but also at companies to which the CEO 
is indirectly connected through a fellow CEO-director on the 
nominating committee. More formally: 
Hypothesis 1: For top managers who lack board appointments, 
ingratiation toward the CEO of their company will be positively asso 
ciated with subsequent appointments (1) at boards (x? ... xn) on 
which the CEO serves as an outside director and (2) at boards to 
which the CEO is indirectly connected (i.e., companies where a fel 
low CEO-director on the nominating committee of x? serves as an 
outside board member). 
Ingratiation as a Substitute for Elite Social and 
Educational Credentials 
Ingratiatory behavior directed at CEOs may be particularly 
valuable for individuals who lack elite social and educational 
credentials that prior empirical research has shown enhance 
the likelihood that managers will receive invitations to serve 
on corporate boards of large U.S. companies. In perhaps the 
most extensive study of board appointments to date, Useem 
and Karabel (1986) found that managers were more likely to 
receive outside director appointments if they possessed a 
Bachelor's degree (BA) from a top ranked college or an MBA 
from a prominent program, membership in an exclusive 
social club, or indications of an upper-class background, such 
as being listed in the Social Register or having attended an 
exclusive preparatory school.1 On one level, these character 
istics are thought to furnish social capital that can increase 
access to board positions. Attendance at an elite educational 
175/ASQ, June 2006 
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In work on the corporate elite, Domhoff 
(1978, 2002) has provided extensive quali 
tative evidence that inclusion in the Social 
Register ano attendance at exclusive 
preparatory schools provide valid indica 
tors of upper class status (see also Broad, 
1996), and a long line of empirical studies 
have used these characteristics to indi 
cate such status (e.g., Useem and Kara 
bel, 1986; Ratcliffe, 1987; Burris, 1991, 
2001; Palmerand Barber, 2001). 
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institution or membership in a prestigious social club "plugs 
[individuals] into elite social networks" (Palmer and Barber, 
2001: 93). As a result, managers with such credentials tend 
to have more direct and indirect social ties to incumbent 
directors at large companies, increasing the frequency with 
which they are considered for board appointments. 
More generally, managers who have elite social and educa 
tional credentials are more likely to ascend to the highest 
level of the corporation through homosocial reproduction 
(Kanter, 1977; Useem and Karabel, 1986; Domhoff, 2002). 
Given that elite credentials are overrepresented among the 
inner circle of corporate leaders, similarity-attraction biases 
should tend to favor director candidates who share them 
(Useem and Karabel, 1986: 193-194). Moreover, attendance 
at elite educational institutions and membership in exclusive 
social clubs is thought to acculturate managers into norms of 
elite behavior and socialize them into common belief sys 
tems (Domhoff, 1978, 2002; Koenig and Gogel, 1981; 
Useem, 1984; Palmer, 1987). Thus appointing managers who 
are affiliated with elite institutions, or who share the same 
class background, serves to reduce social uncertainty in the 
boardroom (Kanter, 1977; Domhoff, 2002). 
For those managers who lack the elite social and educational 
credentials that increase the likelihood of gaining board 
appointments at large companies, our theoretical argument 
suggests that interpersonal influence behavior in the form of 
ingratiation tactics directed at corporate leaders may partially 
substitute for those credentials, providing an alternative path 
way to the corporate boardroom. If such influence behavior 
can increase the likelihood of securing a CEO's recommenda 
tion for a board position, then ingratiation can substitute to 
some extent for the social capital provided by an upper class 
background, attendance at elite educational institutions, or 
membership in prestigious clubs. 
Given widespread norms to conform to the CEO's preference 
on strategic issues, managers who engage in ingratiatory 
behavior and otherwise adopt a deferential posture toward 
their CEO may reduce uncertainty about their social fit with 
incumbent board members. Thus displays of ingratiation 
toward the CEO may help alleviate uncertainty about the 
social fit of managers who lack elite social and educational 
credentials. Conversely, there is less need to engage in ingra 
tiatory behavior if one has elite social and educational creden 
tials, as such credentials create the presumption of social fit 
with board members of large companies (Domhoff, 2002). In 
effect, for such individuals, ingratiatory behavior may be 
redundant to some degree with information conveyed by 
elite social and educational credentials. 
Therefore, our theoretical argument suggests that ingratiatory 
behavior toward the CEO may interact with elite social affilia 
tions and educational credentials to predict the likelihood of 
gaining board appointments. We hypothesize interactions 
between manager ingratiation and four characteristics that, 
as discussed above, are thought to furnish social capital in 
the corporate elite and have been shown in prior research to 
176/ASQ, June 2006 
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increase the likelihood of gaining board appointments (e.g., 
Useem and Karabel, 1986): 
Hypothesis 2: For top managers who lack board appointments, the 
relationship between ingratiation toward the CEO and subsequent 
appointments (1) at boards on which the CEO serves as an outside 
director and (2) at boards to which the CEO is indirectly connected 
will be greater if the manager (a) does not hold a degree from an 
elite undergraduate institution; (b) does not hold an MBA degree 
from an elite graduate school of business; (c) is not a member of an 
exclusive social club; or (d) did not attend an exclusive preparatory 
school and is not listed in the Social Register. 
Ingratiation as a Substitute for Gender or Ethnic Majority 
Status 
Interpersonal influence tactics may also be particularly benefi 
cial in gaining board appointments for demographic minori 
ties. There is considerable evidence from research in social 
psychology and organizational behavior that similarity on 
salient demographic characteristics enhances interpersonal 
affect and liking. The literature on relational demography sug 
gests that demographic similarity in superior-subordinate 
dyads, such as CEO-top-manager dyads, enhances mutual 
affect (e.g., Tsui and O'Reilly, 1989; for a review, see 
Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). These effects are most pro 
nounced for easily observable or cognitively accessible char 
acteristics such as race and gender (Tsui, Egan, and O'Reilly, 
1992; Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). 
Contemporary interpretations of similarity-attraction bias are 
rooted in self-categorization theory. From this perspective, 
individuals routinely classify themselves and others into 
social categories in order to simplify their social world (Turner, 
1987; Hewstone, Hantzi, and Johnston, 1991; Shah, Kruglan 
ski, and Thompson, 1998). Research in the so-called minimal 
groups paradigm suggests that such categorization can be 
triggered by virtually any salient social feature, including read 
ily observable characteristics such as race and gender (Brew 
er and Kramer, 1985; Messick and Mackie, 1989). There is 
evidence that social categorization on the basis of race and 
gender often occurs "automatically and without conscious 
awareness" (Hewstone, Hantzi, and Johnston, 1991: 579; 
Verkuyten, Drabbles, and Van den Nieuwenhuijzen, 1999). 
Because categories that include the self are held in positive 
regard, social categorization provides the basis for in-group 
favoritism, or a systematic tendency to favor others with 
whom one shares salient social features. People exhibit more 
positive affect toward in-group members and allocate more 
positive outcomes to them, including promotion opportunities 
(Hogg and Hardie, 1991; Verkuyten, Drabbles, and Van den 
Nieuwenhuijzen, 1999; DeCremer, 2001; Hertel and Kerr, 
2001; Gardham and Brown, 2001). Accordingly, in-group 
favoritism can also explain why similarity in salient demo 
graphic characteristics such as race and gender increases the 
likelihood that superiors will recommend subordinates for 
promotion (Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). 
Theory and research on similarity-attraction and in-group 
favoritism would suggest that similarity between CEOs and 
top managers on salient features such as race and gender 
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In our study, demographic dissimilarity 
from the CEO is effectively equivalent to 
having minority status, as all CEOs in our 
sample were white males. 
should enhance the CEO's positive affect for the manager 
and lead the CEO to favor the manager in allocating positive 
outcomes, such as recommendations for promotion or presti 
gious appointments. Conversely, managers who are different 
from the CEO on these characteristics are less likely to 
engender positive affect in the CEO and are thus disadvan 
taged in securing such outcomes. Though there is evidence 
that race and gender provide a salient and to some extent 
"automatic" basis for out-group categorization and discrimi 
nation in a variety of social environments (Hewstone, Hantzi, 
and Johnston, 1991: 579), these characteristics may provide 
an especially salient basis for social categorization among top 
managers of large U.S. companies. When a demographic 
characteristic is relatively rare in the population, it is more 
distinctive and thus more salient as a basis for in-group/out 
group categorization (Turner, 1987). Given that women and 
ethnic minorities make up a very small proportion of top 
executives at large U.S. companies (Daily, Certo, and Dalton, 
1999), gender or ethnic minority status is likely to provide a 
highly salient basis for out-group categorization by CEOs 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). Our theoretical perspective on 
interpersonal influence raises the possibility, however, that 
managers who lack in-group status from demographic similar 
ity, like those who lack elite credentials, can use interperson 
al influence behavior as an alternative means of gaining the 
CEO's favor. Because ingratiation engenders positive affect 
for the manager, it may be particularly valuable in securing 
the CEO's recommendation when managers are dissimilar 
from the CEO on salient characteristics.2 In effect, positive 
affect from ingratiation may partially substitute for positive 
affect from demographic similarity to the CEO. 
Moreover, ingratiation tactics may substitute for other advan 
tages from demographic similarity. While similarity on salient 
characteristics can enhance positive affect, it can also create 
the presumption of social fit, thus giving similar others an 
advantage in selection decisions (Kanter, 1977). One manifes 
tation of in-group favoritism is a pre-conscious tendency to 
overestimate attitudinal and behavioral differences between 
in-group members and out-group members, while underesti 
mating differences among in-group members (Hewstone, 
Hantzi, and Johnston, 1991; Shah, Kruglanski, and Thomp 
son, 1998). As a result, given that race and gender provide a 
basis for in-group/out-group categorization, managers are like 
ly to underestimate the social compatibility of job candidates 
who are demographically different from a large portion of the 
group. Similarly, out-group bias should lead CEOs to underes 
timate the social fit of demographic minorities on corporate 
boards. Accordingly, to the extent that ingratiatory behavior 
reduces uncertainty about a manager's social fit on boards of 
large companies, displays of ingratiation toward the CEO 
should be particularly beneficial to demographic minorities. 
Such behavior should compensate to some extent for social 
uncertainty resulting from out-group bias toward minorities, 
enhancing a minority manager's chances of receiving the 
CEO's recommendation for a board seat. As Zweigenhaft and 
Domhoff (1998: 177) suggested, ethnic minorities and 
women "who seek to join the power elite have to find ways 
to ... move into a 'comfort zone' with those who decide 
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who is and is not acceptable for inclusion" (see also Kanter, 
1977: 61). Ingratiatory behavior is a means by which demo 
graphic minorities can move into such a "comfort zone" in 
their relationship to the CEO, making CEOs more comfort 
able about recommending them for board appointments. We 
thus hypothesize that minority status on salient demographic 
characteristics such as race and gender will moderate the 
effect of ingratiation toward the CEO on subsequent board 
appointments: 
Hypothesis 3: For top managers who lack board appointments, the 
relationship between ingratiation toward the CEO and subsequent 
appointments (1) at boards on which the CEO serves as an outside 
director and (2) at boards to which the CEO is indirectly connected 
will be greater for demographic minorities (ethnic minorities and 
women). 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
The sample frame for this study included top managers at 
350 companies randomly selected from the Forbes 500 index 
of large and mid-sized U.S. industrial and service firms. Fol 
lowing Useem and Karabel (1986), we selected up to eight 
senior officers from each company (excluding the CEO) with 
the title of vice president or higher. If the company had more 
than eight senior officers, we randomly selected eight, result 
ing in an initial sample frame of 2,477 managers. We sent a 
survey to each manager in the sample frame and, to permit 
an assessment of interrater reliability, sent a separate survey 
to all CEOs in the sample frame. The surveys were distrib 
uted in January 2000. 
To maximize the response rate, we followed several proce 
dures that have been shown to increase response rates of 
managers in prior research: (1) we conducted a qualitative 
pretest of the survey instrument that involved interviews 
with twenty top managers and directors at large and mid 
sized U.S. companies and used feedback from the interviews 
to improve the format and instructions of the survey, reduc 
ing the time and effort to fill it out; (2) the cover letter linked 
the survey to an ongoing series of studies on corporate gov 
ernance conducted by faculty at several leading business 
schools, noting that hundreds of top managers and directors 
had participated in prior surveys; (3) we sent two additional 
waves of questionnaires to nonrespondents; and (4) the sur 
vey was endorsed by directors at a major management con 
sulting firm (Fox, Crask, and Kim, 1988; Westphal, 1998). 
One thousand and forty-nine managers responded, a 
response rate of 42 percent. The response rate for CEOs 
was 39 percent (N = 138). Demographic data were unavail 
able for 37 respondents, leaving a final sample of 1,012 top 
managers (41 percent). 
We used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to assess the 
representativeness of the sample. This procedure determines 
whether the mean and distribution of a continuous variable is 
significantly different for respondents and nonrespondents. 
Results showed no significant differences with respect to 
any of the continuous variables described below measured 
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with archival data (e.g., firm performance, firm size, number 
of board appointments held by the CEO, CEO tenure at the 
potential hiring firm). Moreover, difference of proportions 
tests showed that respondents and nonrespondents were 
not significantly different with respect to any of the dichoto 
mous variables measured with archival data, including mea 
sures of elite social and educational credentials and minority 
status. We also used a multivariate approach to testing for 
sample selection bias, estimating Heckman sample selection 
models (Heckman and Borjas, 1980) in which the selection 
equation estimated the likelihood of responding to the sur 
vey. The selection equation included all the independent and 
control variables measured with archival data, as well as vari 
ables that represent characteristics of the survey itself (e.g., 
when the questionnaire was distributed). The hypothesized 
results were unchanged from those presented below and the 
selection parameter was not significant, suggesting that non 
response bias is not present in the data. 
We obtained demographic and biographical data on top man 
agers from a variety of sources that have been used exten 
sively in prior research to measure elite social and education 
al credentials, including Dun and Bradstreet's Reference 
Book of Corporate Management, Standard and Poor's Regis 
ter, the Social Register, Marquis's Who's Who, corporate 
proxy statements, and annual company reports (Useem and 
Karabel, 1986; Broad, 1996; Palmerand Barber, 2001; Burris, 
2002; Domhoff, 2002). Data on director and board character 
istics came from Compact Disclosure and proxy statements 
obtained directly from companies in the sample frame. Data 
on top managers' ethnicity and gender were provided by a 
large management consulting firm. We obtained data on firm 
performance and size from COMPUSTAT and EDGAR Online. 
Follow-up survey. Our theoretical argument suggested that 
ingratiation toward the CEO leads to board appointments by 
increasing the likelihood that the CEO will recommend the 
ingratiator for a board seat. To test this argument, in January 
2002, two years after the initial survey, we sent a question 
naire to directors who serve on nominating committees in 
the sample frame. The questionnaire asked directors to spec 
ify whether one or more CEOs who serve on the board had 
suggested that someone be nominated for an outside direc 
tor appointment during the prior two years and if so, who had 
made the recommendation(s) and who was recommended. 
At least one member of the nominating committee respond 
ed for 77 percent of the boards in the sample frame. Using 
these data, we developed a dichotomous variable that indi 
cated whether the CEO recommended the focal manager for 
an outside directorship at the focal board. 
Measures 
We used feedback from the pretest to enhance the validity of 
our survey measures. In our pretest interviews, we asked 
respondents to comment on each question in the survey in 
order to identify questions that were ambiguous or potential 
ly subject to bias and to ensure that respondents interpreted 
the questions as expected. We used varied response formats 
to minimize response bias, and our scales included questions 
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that asked respondents to report the number of times a spe 
cific behavior occurred, which tends to enhance scale validity 
(DeVellis, 1991). 
Ingratiation toward the CEO. The ingratiation scale included 
13 items that were intended to capture the three component 
behaviors of ingratiation, as described in the social influence 
literature: other-enhancement, opinion conformity, and favor 
rendering. Items in the scale were adapted from measures 
developed by Westphal (1998) and Kumar and Beyerlein 
(1991). We made refinements to the wording of the ques 
tions based on feedback from the pretest interviews. The 
survey items are listed in table 1. We conducted factor analy 
sis on the survey items using the principal factor method 
with promax rotation. The analysis included ingratiation items 
together with indicators of self-presentation, discussed 
below, yielding only two factors with an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. The ingratiation items loaded on one factor as expect 
ed: loadings for each item were greater than .5 on one factor 
and less than .2 on the other factor, which comprised the 
self-presentation items. The interitem reliability of the scale 
Table 1 
Ingratiation Scale Items and Interrater Reliability Assessment* 
Agreement between 
Focal Manager and CEO 
Ingratiation Scale ltems+ Observed Kappa* 
1. In talking to [the CEO], to what extent do you express agreement with [the 
CEO's] viewpoint on a strategic issue, even when you do not completely 
share his/her opinion? 
2. Over the past twelve months, how often did you challenge [the CEO's] opin 
ion on a strategic issue?* 
3. In speaking with [the CEO], to what extent do you point out attitudes and/or 
opinions you have in common? 
4. In talking to [the CEO] over the past twelve months, how many times did you 
disagree with [the CEO's] point of view on a strategic issue?* 
5. In speaking with [the CEO] over the past twelve months, to what extent have 
you pointed out weaknesses in his/her strategy for the firm?* 
6. To what extent do you play devil's advocate with [the CEO] in discussing 
strategic issues with him/her?* 
7. In talking to [the CEO] over the past twelve months, how often have you com 
plimented [the CEO] about his/her insight on a particular strategic issue? 
8. If [the CEO] were to make an insightful comment about an important strate 
gic issue, to what extent would you be likely to compliment him/her? 
9. In the past twelve months, how often have you expressed to [the CEO] that 
you enjoy working with him/her? 
10. Over the past twelve months, to what extent have you sought to reassure 
[the CEO] about the soundness of his/her strategic judgment? 
11. In talking to [the CEO] over the past 12 months, to what extent have you 
given him/her advice on a personal or career matter? 
12. Have you done a personal favor for [the CEO] in the past 12 months? 
13. Over the past twelve months, how many times have you given [the CEO] 
advice or other assistance on a strategic matter that is outside your area of 
responsibility, even without the CEO asking for it? 
Overall kappa 
96.71% 
(69.22%) 
93.67% 
(62.46%) 
92.47% 
(60.00%) 
91.24% 
(66.02%) 
95.73% 
(70.02%) 
95.83% 
(54.63%) 
94.71% 
(71.54%) 
92.37% 
(61.82%) 
95.99% 
(73.52%) 
.89 
(38.34) 
.83 
(24.37) 
.81 
(23.48) 
.74 
(31.52) 
.86 
(26.12) 
.91 
(23.95) 
.81 
(25.71) 
.80 
(23.37) 
.85 
(17.46) 
.83 
(24.32) 
* N = 416. The phrasing of each survey item is from the top manager survey; the wording was altered appropriately 
for the CEO survey. Four of the thirteen items were not included in the CEO survey. The expected agreement between 
the focal manager and the CEO is in parentheses under the observed. We calculated kappas for the continuous-scale 
items by dividing the values for each of these items into quartiles. 
* Z-statistics (shown in parentheses below the kappas) for all kappas are statistically significant. 
* This item was reversed scored so that higher values indicate greater ingratiation. 
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was acceptably high (Cronbach's a = .90). We estimated fac 
tor scores using the Bartlett method, which yields unbiased 
estimates (hypothesized results were robust to the regres 
sion method). The CEO survey included a parallel set of 
items about each top manager's behavior toward the CEO 
(e.g., "To what extent does [the manager] express agree 
ment with your viewpoint..."). To assess interrater reliabili 
ty, we compared the top manager's and the CEO's responses 
to the items in both surveys using the weighted kappa coeffi 
cient. Kappa is a correlation coefficient that corrects for the 
level of correlation that would be expected by chance and 
weights agreement by the degree of convergence between 
raters. According to Fleiss (1981), values above .75 indicate 
excellent agreement beyond chance, and values between .4 
and .75 reflect fair to good agreement. As shown in table 1, 
kappas exceeded .75 for all survey items but one, and that 
item is still in the range of good agreement. The overall 
kappa for the scale was .83. The sample for this analysis 
included 416 manager-CEO dyads in which both the manager 
and the CEO assessed the focal manager's behavior. On 
average, assessments were available from both the manager 
and the CEO for 1.44 dyads per firm in the sample; the num 
ber of dyads with assessments from both parties ranged 
from 0 to 7 per firm. 
As noted above, the social influence literature suggests that 
people who engage in ingratiatory behavior toward high 
status others in one setting are likely to do so in other set 
tings. Thus, as a further test of the validity of the ingratiation 
measure, we examined whether our measure of ingratiation 
toward the CEO was correlated with a measure of ingratia 
tion by the same manager at another company. The follow-up 
survey included questions about the behavior of other out 
side directors, including items that assessed the ingratiatory 
behavior of directors toward the CEO. The items in this scale 
were a subset of the items listed in table 1. We merged 
these data with responses to the initial survey to generate a 
dataset on the ingratiatory behavior exhibited by managers at 
two different companies, i.e., ingratiation toward the CEO of 
the focal firm at time t and ingratiation toward the CEO of 
another firm where the manager served as an outside direc 
tor at time t+2 (N = 226). This enabled us to examine 
whether ingratiation toward the CEO of the focal firm was 
correlated with ingratiation toward the CEO at another com 
pany where the manager served as an outside director. Our 
analysis indicated a strong correlation between ingratiation at 
the focal firm and ingratiation at the other company (r = .42), 
providing further evidence for the validity of our ingratiation 
measure. Additional evidence for the validity of the ingratia 
tion scale is provided in the Appendix. 
Elite social and educational credentials; gender and eth 
nic minority status. We created a series of dummy variables 
to indicate whether managers had the elite social and educa 
tional credentials specified in our hypotheses. Two dummy 
variables indicated whether managers held a degree from an 
elite undergraduate institution and/or an MBA degree from an 
elite graduate school of business, using elite designations 
taken from Palmer and Barber (2001) and Useem and Karabel 
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(1986) (see also Westphal and Milton, 2000, and Domhoff, 
2002, for more detail on these measures). One dummy vari 
able indicates whether managers were members of one or 
more of the most exclusive social clubs in the U.S., as desig 
nated by Palmer and Barber (2001) and Domhoff (1970). 
Another dummy variable indicated whether managers were 
listed in the Social Register and/or attended an exclusive 
preparatory school. Exclusive preparatory school designations 
were taken from Palmer and Barber (2001), Useem and Kara 
bel (1986), and Domhoff (1970) (see also Levine, 1980). We 
also created a dummy variable to indicate minority status 
with respect to ethnicity and/or gender. 
Board appointment. We developed dichotomous measures 
to indicate whether the focal manager was appointed to a 
particular board (x) where the CEO served as director at the 
time of the survey or a board to which the CEO was indirect 
ly connected (i.e., a board where a fellow CEO-director on 
the nominating committee of x. served as an outside direc 
tor). We examined appointments at all firms in the Forbes 
listing of large and medium-sized U.S. firms for which data 
were available. In the primary analysis, we examined board 
appointments over the two-year period subsequent to the 
time of the survey. In separate analyses, we examined board 
appointments over shorter and longer time periods (one year 
and three years), and the hypothesized results presented 
below were unchanged. 
Control variables. We controlled for aspects of the manager 
CEO relationship that could affect the likelihood of receiving 
the CEO's recommendation for a board appointment. First, 
there is some evidence that the frequency of social interac 
tion in superior-subordinate dyads can increase the likelihood 
of favoritism toward the subordinate independent of ingratia 
tory behavior, although the evidence for this relationship is 
somewhat weak and inconsistent (cf. Vonk, 2002). As a pre 
caution, we included a survey measure that gauges the level 
of social interaction between managers and CEOs over the 
prior six-month period. The scale showed acceptable 
interitem and interrater reliability (a = .85, kappa = .79). We 
also included a survey measure of friendship between the 
CEO and the manager (cf. Burt, 1992), given that CEOs may 
be more likely to recommend their friends for board appoint 
ments. There is some evidence that friendship is negatively 
correlated with ingratiation (Westphal, 1998), in which case 
friendship may operate as a suppressor variable. There was a 
high level of interrater agreement (93 percent) between man 
agers and CEOs about the status of their relationship as 
friends vs. acquaintances. 
Some theorists have maintained that self-promotion or "self 
presentation" provides an alternative source of influence to 
ingratiation (e.g., Jones and Pittman, 1982), in which case, 
self-presentation could confound the effects of ingratiation on 
board appointments. Although there is evidence that self-pre 
sentation is often less effective than ingratiation as a source 
of interpersonal influence (Godfrey, Jones, and Lord, 1986), 
prior studies have not examined self-presentation among cor 
porate elites. There is some evidence that high self-monitors 
are relatively successful in their use of self-presentation tac 
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Unless otherwise indicated, board-level 
and firm-level characteristics refer to the 
board or firm at which the CEO served as 
a director. 
tics (Turnley and Bolino, 2001), and this personality trait is 
known to be prevalent among top managers. Thus we includ 
ed a survey measure of self-presentation with items adapted 
from a scale developed by Stevens and Kristof (1995) (a = 
.87, kappa 
= 
.80). 
Managers could be more attractive candidates for board posi 
tions to the extent that they have extensive prior experience 
in top management. Thus we controlled for the number of 
years the focal manager had served as a top executive of a 
firm in the sample frame. We also controlled for indicators of 
CEO status, as CEOs with high status may have more pull in 
getting board appointments for their managers, and man 
agers may engage in more ingratiatory behavior toward high 
status CEOs. We included several indicators of CEO status 
that have been used extensively in prior research to indicate 
the status of top managers and directors (e.g., Useem, 1984; 
D'Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein, 1992; Palmerand Barber, 2001; 
Westphal and Khanna, 2003): the size of the CEO's primary 
employer, measured as the log of firm sales; the perfor 
mance of the CEO's firm, measured as industry-adjusted 
market-to-book value; and the number of board appointments 
held by the CEO. We also included a set of dummy variables 
that indicated whether the CEO had each of the elite social 
and educational credentials discussed above. We did not con 
trol for whether CEOs were demographic minorities, because 
every CEO in our sample was a white male. Moreover, while 
CEO-directors tend to have more influence over director 
selection than other board members, as discussed above, 
long-tenured directors may have particular influence over this 
process. Thus we controlled for the CEO's tenure as an out 
side director on the board, measured in years. We also con 
trolled for whether the CEO left the board in the current year 
(i.e., the year of the survey) or the following year. 
An agency perspective on director selection might suggest 
that independent boards will engage in a more "objective" 
search for new directors, so that personal recommendations 
would have less influence over the director selection process 
at such boards. Although available evidence suggests that 
personal recommendations are an important input to director 
selection regardless of the board's independence from man 
agement (cf. Seidel and Westphal, 2004), as a precaution, we 
controlled for several indicators of board independence that 
have been widely used in the corporate governance literature 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Chatterjee and Harrison, 
2001; Pollock, Fischer, and Wade, 2002): separation of the 
CEO and board chair positions, the portion of outside direc 
tors appointed after the CEO, average director stock owner 
ship, and relative CEO-board tenure (i.e., the average board 
tenure of directors divided by the CEO's tenure). We com 
bined these measures into a single index using principal com 
ponents analysis (Jackson, 1991).3 Although the number of 
outside directors on the board could influence the likelihood 
that one or more new directors are appointed in any given 
year, it is not clear why the number of outsiders would con 
found the hypothesized effects of ingratiation, and separate 
analyses confirmed that the results are unchanged when the 
number of outside directors is added to the models. 
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We also controlled for the size and performance of the 
potential hiring firm (i.e., the firm where the CEO served as a 
director or the firm to which the CEO was indirectly connect 
ed), measured as log of sales and industry-adjusted market 
to-book value, respectively. Moreover, we included dummy 
variables to indicate the focal manager's level in the hierarchy 
(i.e., executive vice president or senior vice president, with 
vice president as the reference category). We did not control 
for whether the focal manager was an inside director, as this 
variable was highly correlated with level in the hierarchy and 
did not have an independent effect on board appointments. 
We also did not control for industry in the primary analyses, 
as we did not expect industry differences in the hypothesized 
effect of ingratiation on board appointments. Nevertheless, in 
separate models, we included dummy variables for the N-1 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes in the sam 
ple, and the hypothesized results were unchanged. In further 
analyses, we also controlled for whether the focal firm had 
an ownership position in the potential hiring firm, which may 
increase a manager's chances of receiving an appointment 
(Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, 1986). The control variable was 
not significant and the hypotheses were still supported. The 
interaction between ingratiation and ownership position was 
also not significant and had no substantive effect on the 
hypothesized results. 
Analysis 
We used maximum-likelihood probit regression analysis to 
test the hypothesized effects of ingratiation on the likelihood 
of board appointments. Though our sample frame included 
3,251 dyadic combinations of managers and boards on which 
the CEO served as an outside director, our focus on man 
agers who lacked outside board appointments narrowed our 
risk set to 1,478 dyads in which the manager had no board 
appointments (a survey question was used to verify whether 
or not responding managers served on a board at the time of 
the survey). Similarly, although our analysis of appointments 
at boards to which the CEO was indirectly connected was 
based on a sample frame of 12,698 dyads, this analysis 
included a smaller risk set of 5,877 dyads in which the man 
ager had no board appointments. To ensure that probit esti 
mates were not biased by any unmeasured differences 
between the narrowed sample of manager-board dyads and 
dyads in the total sample frame, we used Heckman selection 
models. The Heckman model is essentially a two-stage pro 
cedure that uses probit regression to estimate the likelihood 
of having no outside board appointments and then incorpo 
rates estimates of parameters from that model in a second 
stage probit regression model to estimate the likelihood of 
acquiring an appointment at a particular board on which the 
CEO serves as a director. 
Because our sample included multiple dyadic combinations 
that involved the same CEO or the same board, we had to 
control for the possibility that the residuals for dyads involv 
ing the same CEO or board were correlated. We corrected 
for observation clustering using the Newey-West robust vari 
ance estimator for clustered data (Newey and West, 1987), 
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which treats each cluster (i.e., CEO and board) as a super 
observation that contributes to the variance estimate. 
To assess the robustness of our results, we ran separate 
models using fixed-effects logistic regression. In the first set 
of models, we specified the CEO as a fixed effect, and in the 
second set of models, we specified the board as a fixed 
effect. In all of these models, the hypothesized results were 
not substantively different from those presented below. We 
also ran a separate set of Heckman models in which the 
selection equation included all dyadic combinations of 
responding managers and boards in the larger sample frame 
and estimated the likelihood that a dyad included a board on 
which the CEO served as a director or a board to which the 
CEO was indirectly connected. The hypothesized results 
remained unchanged, indicating that our findings do not 
reflect differences between the characteristics of boards or 
firms where the CEO served as a director and the character 
istics of boards or firms in the larger population. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are displayed 
in table 2. Table 3 provides the results of the Heckman selec 
tion models of board appointments. There was no evidence 
for multicollinearity in the models. The highest variance infla 
tion factor (VIF) was less than ten, and the mean VIF was not 
significantly greater than one in all models, suggesting that 
multicollinearity was not a problem (Chatterjee, Hadi, and 
Price, 2000). Model 1 provides strong support for hypothesis 
1 : for top managers who lack board appointments, ingratia 
tion toward the CEO is positively associated with subsequent 
board appointments at companies where the CEO serves as 
an outside director. The magnitude of this effect is consider 
able. For instance, an increase in ingratiation from the mean 
level that involves (1) challenging the CEO's opinion on a 
strategic issue one less time during the past 12 months, (2) 
complimenting the CEO on his or her insight on a strategic 
issue two more times during the past twelve months, and (3) 
doing one more personal favor for the CEO during the past 
year increases the likelihood of receiving a board appoint 
ment at a company where the CEO serves as a director by 
64 percent (this figure is coincidentally the same as the pro 
bit regression coefficient for ingratiation in model 2). Results 
in model 3 also indicate that ingratiation toward the CEO is 
positively associated with subsequent appointments at 
boards to which the CEO is indirectly connected. 
Model 2 tests the interactions predicted in hypotheses 2a-2d 
and hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 2a predicted that for top man 
agers who lack board appointments, the relationship 
between ingratiation toward the CEO and subsequent board 
appointments will be greater if the manager does not hold a 
degree from an elite undergraduate institution. Results in 
models 2 and 4 of table 3 strongly support this hypothesis: 
ingratiation toward the CEO is particularly valuable for individ 
uals who lack a degree from an elite undergraduate institu 
tion. The shape of the interaction is displayed in figure 1. The 
results do not support hypothesis 2b, which predicted that 
ingratiation would have a greater effect for managers who do 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 1,478) 
Independent variable Mean S.D. 1 10 11 
Ingratiation toward the CEO 
Number of board 3 
appointments held by CEO 
Executive vice president 
Senior vice president 
Friendship tie to CEO 
Top management experience 5 
Independence of board 
where CEO serves as director 
8. CEO tenure as outside dir. 6 
9. Self-presentation 
10. Social interaction with CEO 
11. Listing in Social Register/ 
attendance at exclusive 
prep school 
Elite undergraduate degree 
Elite MBA 
Exclusive social club membership 
Demographic minority 
CEO with elite undergraduate 
degree 
CEO with listing in 
Social Register/attendance 
at exclusive prep school 
CEO with elite MBA 
CEO with exclusive social 
club membership 
Log of sales, potential ? 
hiring company 
Market-to-book value, 
CEO home company 
Log of sales, ? 
CEO home company 
Market-to-book value, 
potential hiring company 
24. CEO departure from board 
where CEO serves as director 
25. Board appointment 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
.00 .98 
.21 2.15 
.18 .39 
.23 .42 
.39 .64 
.56 7.19 
.00 1.41 
.67 6.19 
.00 .83 
.00 .88 
.11 .31 
.22 .42 
.05 .23 
.29 .46 
.08 .27 
.28 .45 
.21 
.05 
.02 
,08 
-.04 
.00 
.04 
.06 
-.03 
-.24 
,19 
,07 
,23 
.18 
.17 
.02 
.01 
.02 
.01 
-.01 
.03 
.15 
.06 
.04 
.04 
,02 
.07 
,01 
.15 
,25 
.09 
.27 
.00 
,01 
.04 
.05 
.03 
.00 
.01 
.02 
,07 
.00 
.05 
.16 
.00 
.01 
.03 
.03 
-.02 
.00 
.00 
,02 
-.03 
.00 
.03 
.01 .02 
.01 -.02 
.04 .04 
.31 .03 
.11 -.05 
-.08 
.00 .02 
,01 .01 -.04 
,05 .03 -.19 .05 
.05 
.01 
.07 
,14 
.04 
,07 
-.03 
,12 
.04 
.00 
,02 .01 
,02 -.04 
,01 .02 
.00 .01 
,03 .06 
,11 .03 .24 
,06 .01 .02 
,14 .06 .32 
.22 -.04 -.06 
.12 .03 .08 
,15 .35 .14 .22 .02 -.01 .07 -.02 -.01 .10 .11 .06 
.08 .26 .04 .03 .00 .01 -.01 .01 
.30 .46 .18 .16 .01 -.02 .03 .00 
.07 .89 .02 .02 -.01 .00 .00 .03 
.01 .54 -.04 .01 .00 .01 -.02 .03 
.30 .87 .03 .05 -.01 .01 .02 -.01 
.01 .50 .01 .05 -.01 .00 .02 .01 
.31 .46 .02 .31 .00 -.01 .02 .01 
.09 .29 .26 .21 .08 .03 .12 .02 
.14 
,02 .02 .01 .00 .03 
-.03 .07 .09 .04 .05 
,04 .07 .01 -.01 .02 
.00 .01 -.06 .03 .04 
,01 .00 .03 -.04 .02 
.01 .04 .04 .02 -.01 
.05 .16 -.01 .02 .00 
,06 .04 .04 .03 .18 
Independent variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13. Elite MBA .12 
14. Exclusive social club membership .15 .03 
15. Demographic minority -.10 .02 
16. CEO with elite undergraduate .11 .06 
degree 
CEO with listing in 
Social Register/attendance 
at exclusive prep school 
CEO with elite MBA .07 .09 
CEO with exclusive social .04 .01 
club membership 
Log of sales, potential .01 .01 
hiring company 
Market-to-book value, .03 .01 
CEO home company 
22. Log of sales, .06 .08 
CEO home company 
Market-to-book value, .00 .00 
potential hiring company 
CEO departure from board .04 -.01 
where CEO serves as director 
25. Board appointment .15 .06 
17 
18 
19 
20, 
21, 
23 
24 
,19 
.04 -.06 
,20 .01 .29 -.02 .14 
.02 -.03 .14 .05 
.11 -.05 .15 .18 .08 
.00 -.01 .03 .05 .01 .04 
.06 -.04 .07 .04 .00 .04 
.03 .01 .05 .04 .05 .02 
.02 -.01 .01 -.03 -.02 -.03 
.01 .00 .27 .21 .03 .18 
.13 -.20 .22 .07 .03 .06 
.01 
.04 -.04 
-.03 .02 .00 
.02 -.04 -.02 -.03 
.02 -.01 .04 -.05 -.23 
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Table 3 
Heckman Selection Models of Board Appointments* 
Appointments at 
boards where the 
CEO served 
as director 
Appointments at 
boards to which 
CEO was Appointments at 
indirectly connected other boards 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Ingratiation toward the CEO 
Number of board appointments held by CEO 
Executive vice president 
Senior vice president 
Friendship tie to CEO 
Top management experience 
Independence of board where CEO serves as 
director 
CEO tenure as outside director 
Self-presentation 
Social interaction with CEO 
Listing in Social Register/attendance at exclusive 
prep school 
Elite undergraduate degree 
Elite MBA 
Exclusive social club membership 
Demographic minority 
CEO with elite undergraduate degree 
CEO with listing in Social Register/attendance at 
exclusive prep school 
CEO with elite MBA 
CEO with exclusive social club membership 
Log of sales, potential hiring company 
Market-to-book value, CEO home company 
Log of sales, CEO home company 
Market-to-book value, potential hiring company 
CEO departure from board where CEO served as 
director 
Ingratiation x 
(Lack of) elite undergraduate degree 
(Lack of) elite MBA 
(Lack of) exclusive social club membership 
(Lack of) listing in Social Register/attendance at 
exclusive prep school 
Demographic minority 
Constant 
Wald x2 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0) 
N (first-stage model; 
second-stage model) 
0.557 
(0.135) 
0.108 
(0.041) 
0.497* 
(0.245) 
0.419 
(0.262) 
0.368* 
(0.163) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.123 
(0.081) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
0.096 
(0.093) 
0.088 
(0.126) 
1.011* 
(0.425) 
0.567* 
(0.249) 
0.595 
(0.490) 
0.417 
(0.212) 
-0.629* 
(.278) 
0.846 
(0.289) 
0.548 
(0.300) 
0.255 
(0.258) 
0.209 
(0.207) 
0.038 
(0.086) 
-0.044 
(0.174) 
0.152 
(0.116) 
-0.254 
(0.174) 
.189 
(.209) 
1.979* 
(0.974) 
50.66? 
8.11 
3,251; 
1,478 
0.639 
(0.162) 
0.111 
(0.039) 
0.510* 
(0.249) 
0.389 
(0.258) 
0.383* 
(0.167) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.106 
(0.073) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
0.131 
(0.091) 
0.140 
(0.128) 
0.955* 
(0.427) 
0.484* 
(0.220) 
0.785 
(0.494) 
0.443 
(0.237) 
-.738* 
(.324) 
0.850 
(0.263) 
0.539 
(0.297) 
0.248 
(0.326) 
0.257 
(0.201) 
0.036 
(0.089) 
-0.062 
(0.178) 
0.146 
(0.107) 
-0.263 
(0.198) 
.196 
(.212) 
0.899 
(0.290) 
-0.319 
(0.241) 
0.445* 
(0.195) 
1.058 
(0.309) 
1.070 
(0.429) 
2.122* 
(0.930) 
85.04? 
8.01 
3,251; 
1,478 
0.354 
(0.129) 
0.100* 
(0.041) 
0.074 
(0.232) 
0.154 
(0.248) 
0.296* 
(0.141) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.102 
(0.079) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.174 
(0.092) 
0.112 
(0.111) 
1.018* 
(0.412) 
0.425 
(0.219) 
0.428 
(0.470) 
0.444* 
(0.202) 
-0.543* 
(0.265) 
0.539* 
(0.259) 
0.571* 
(0.277) 
0.370 
(0.252) 
0.224 
(0.200) 
0.041 
(0.082) 
0.229 
(0.155) 
0.206 
(0.117) 
0.212 
(0.158) 
2.206* 
(0.985) 
48.98? 
5.23* 
12,698; 
5,735 
0.383 
(0.155) 
0.103 
(0.040) 
0.096 
(0.233) 
0.149 
(0.262) 
0.284* 
(0.141) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.090 
(0.070) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.149 
(0.087) 
0.126 
(0.112) 
1.070 
(0.423) 
0.420* 
(0.209) 
0.591 
(0.458) 
0.497* 
(0.229) 
-0.577* 
(0.287) 
0.511* 
(0.242) 
0.606* 
(0.284) 
0.394 
(0.272) 
0.254 
(0.192) 
0.054 
(0.085) 
0.221 
(0.156) 
0.224 
(0.123) 
0.242 
(0.169) 
0.696 
(0.249) 
0.201 
(0.216) 
0.336* 
(0.181) 
0.764 
(0.293) 
0.851* 
(0.411) 
2.022* 
(0.945) 
77.82? 
7.15 
12,698; 
5,735 
0.033 
(0.033) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.026 
(0.100) 
0.164* 
(0.069) 
0.043 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.022 
(0.042) 
-0.040 
(0.052) 
0.125 
(0.157) 
0.172 
(0.089) 
0.070 
(0.138) 
0.137 
(0.080) 
-0.226* 
(0.106) 
0.012 
(0.084) 
0.213 
(0.131) 
0.163 
(0.123) 
0.053 
(0.075) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
0.082 
(0.076) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
0.022 
(0.067) 
-1.189* 
(0.426) 
24.91 
.64 
767,096; 
347,311 
0.019 
(0.045) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.024 
(0.100) 
0.147* 
(0.069) 
0.044 
(0.061) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.020 
(0.042) 
-0.035 
(0.052) 
0.145 
(0.169) 
0.177 
(0.093) 
0.064 
(0.137) 
0.140 
(0.079) 
-0.235* 
(0.111) 
0.007 
(0.083) 
0.209 
(0.135) 
0.152 
(0.121) 
0.056 
(0.075) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
0.089 
(0.077) 
-0.030 
(0.038) 
0.014 
(0.069) 
0.146 
(0.103) 
0.043 
(0.074) 
-0.014 
(0.081) 
0.080 
(0.157) 
0.160 
(0.142) 
-1.105 
(0.430) 
28.70 
.54 
767,096; 
347,311 
* 
p < .05; 
? 
p < .01 ; 
?* 
p < .001 ; z-statistics are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. h Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Interaction between ingratiation and elite undergraduate degree. 
Likelihood of 
Receiving 
Board Appoint 
ment Where 
CEO Serves as 
Director 
-0.50 0.00 0.50 
Ingratiation toward CEO 
1.00 
not hold an MBA degree from an elite graduate school of 
business on the likelihood of gaining subsequent board 
appointments at companies where the CEO serves as a 
director. 
The results also support hypotheses 2c-2d. Ingratiation has a 
more significant effect on the likelihood of gaining appoint 
ments at boards where the CEO serves as director and to 
which the CEO is indirectly connected for managers who are 
not members of an exclusive social club and for managers 
who did not attend an exclusive preparatory school and are 
not listed in the Social Register. Moreover, while the main 
effects of elite social and educational credentials on subse 
quent board appointments are significant (with the exception 
of an elite MBA), a separate analysis of simple effects 
showed that these variables become non-significant at rela 
tively high levels of ingratiation toward the CEO (e.g., one 
standard deviation above the mean). 
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that the effect of ingratiation 
on board appointments would be stronger for demographic 
minorities, is also supported. The effect of ingratiation on the 
likelihood of gaining subsequent board appointments at com 
panies where the CEO served as director is significantly 
greater if the manager was a woman or an ethnic minority. 
This interaction also significantly predicts appointments at 
boards to which the CEO was indirectly connected. More 
over, while the main effect of minority status is significant, a 
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separate analysis of simple effects showed that this variable 
also becomes non-significant at high levels of ingratiation 
toward the CEO (e.g., one standard deviation above the 
mean). Overall, the results substantiate our contention that 
interpersonal influence behavior can substitute for elite cre 
dentials and demographic majority status in gaining access to 
board appointments. The findings indicate that ingratiatory 
behavior by top managers toward CEOs increases the likeli 
hood that managers will receive appointments at boards on 
which the CEO serves as a director and at boards to which 
the CEO is indirectly connected, and the effects of ingratia 
tion are significantly more positive for managers who lack 
social and educational credentials and for ethnic minorities 
and women. In addition, ingratiation is negatively correlated 
with demographic majority status and each of the elite social 
and educational credentials, which appears to corroborate our 
contention that managers who have these characteristics 
have less need to engage in ingratiation. 
We conducted a supplementary analysis to examine whether 
recommendation by the CEO mediates the effect of ingratia 
tion toward the CEO on subsequent board appointments. 
The results, shown in table 4, provided evidence for media 
Table 4 
Supplemental Heckman Selection Models of Board Appointments* 
Appointments at boards where 
the CEO served as director 
Appointments at 
boards to which 
CEO was indirectly 
connected 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recommendation by 
the CEO 
Ingratiation toward 
the CEO 
Number of board 
appointments held 
by CEO 
Executive vice president 
Senior vice president 
Friendship tie to CEO 
Top management 
experience 
Independence of board 
where CEO serves 
as director 
CEO tenure as outside 
director 
Self-presentation 
Social interaction 
with CEO 
Listing in Social Register/ 
attendance at 
exclusive prep school 
Elite undergraduate 
degree 
Elite MBA 
1.743? 
(0.205) 
0.250 
(0.181) 
0.114 
(0.042) 
0.586* 
(0.289) 
0.382 
(0.236) 
0.210 
(0.134) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.120 
(0.085) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0.049 
(0.111) 
0.098 
(0.144) 
0.909* 
(0.435) 
0.519* 
(0.234) 
0.763 
(0.505) 
0.561 
(0.141) 
0.104* 
(0.049) 
-0.030 
(0.249) 
0.260 
(0.257) 
0.332 
(0.170) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.103 
(0.089) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
0.171 
(0.098) 
0.121 
(0.120) 
1.152 
(0.430) 
0.463 
(0.234) 
0.447 
(0.481) 
0.590 
(0.168) 
0.113* 
(0.052) 
-0.038 
(0.250) 
0.261 
(0.266) 
0.327 
(0.173) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.069 
(0.091) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.179 
(0.109) 
0.121 
(0.122) 
1.209 
(0.453) 
0.436 
(0.237) 
0.486 
(0.486) 
0.340 
(0.122) 
0.082* 
(0.036) 
-0.094 
(0.214) 
0.167 
(0.231) 
0.356* 
(0.155) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.141 
(0.074) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.144 
(0.107) 
0.171 
(0.115) 
0.933* 
(0.395) 
0.429* 
(0.183) 
0.564 
(0.444) 
0.405 
(0.165) 
0.078* 
(0.035) 
0.101 
(0.214) 
0.126 
(0.233) 
0.332* 
(0.148) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.141 
(0.076) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.160 
(0.105) 
0.170 
(0.117) 
0.905* 
(0.406) 
0.492* 
(0.217) 
0.597 
(0.474) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Appointments at boards where 
the CEO served as director 
Appointments at 
boards to which 
CEO was indirectly 
connected 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Exclusive social club 
membership 
Demographic minority 
CEO with elite 
undergraduate degree 
CEO with listing 
in Social Register/attendance 
at exclusive prep school 
CEO with elite MBA 
CEO with exclusive 
social club membership 
Log of sales, potential 
hiring company 
Market-to-book value, 
CEO home company 
Log of sales, CEO 
home company 
Market-to-book value, 
potential hiring 
company 
Need for power 
Self-monitoring 
CEO departure from 
board where CEO 
serves as director 
Ingratiation x 
(Lack of) elite 
undergraduate degree 
(Lack of) elite MBA 
(Lack of) exclusive social 
club membership 
(Lack of) listing in 
Social Register/attendance at 
exclusive prep school 
Demographic minority 
Constant 
Wald x2 
Wald test of independent 
equations (rho = 0) 
N 
0.439 
(0.251) 
-0.632 
(0.331) 
0.789" 
(0.286) 
0.498 
(0.304) 
0.440 
(0.341) 
0.258 
(0.205) 
0.029 
(0.092) 
-.220 
(.184) 
0.121 
(0.103) 
-0.220 
(0.184) 
0.500 
(0.305) 
-0.301 
(0.243) 
0.213 
(0.215) 
0.363 
(0.310) 
0.444 
(0.431) 
2.202* 
(1.029) 
96.47? 
8.07 
2,479; 
1,125 
0.463* 
(0.208) 
-0.698* 
(0.291) 
0.735 
(0.283) 
0.533 
(0.275) 
0.321 
(0.275) 
0.171 
(0.216) 
0.094 
(0.097) 
0.023 
(0.179) 
0.172 
(0.114) 
0.388* 
(0.172) 
0.116 
(0.086) 
0.103 
(0.069) 
0.180 
(0.185) 
2.091 
(1.142) 
47.80 
9.03 
1,341; 
606 
0.486* 
(0.218) 
-0.671* 
(0.288) 
0.657* 
(0.275) 
0.562 
(0.285) 
0.314 
(0.278) 
0.162 
(0.211) 
0.079 
(0.084) 
0.036 
(0.171) 
0.184 
(0.124) 
0.394* 
(0.177) 
0.129 
(0.097) 
0.110 
(0.079) 
0.197 
(0.203) 
0.815 
(0.304) 
-0.316 
(0.185) 
0.430* 
(0.201) 
1.046? 
(0.329) 
1.273 
(0.442) 
2.866* 
(1.352) 
78.15? 
8.39 
1,341; 
606 
0.475* 
(0.197) 
-0.687* 
(0.277) 
0.520* 
(0.208) 
0.512 
(0.260) 
0.340 
(0.240) 
0.267 
(0.193) 
0.050 
(0.076) 
0.064 
(0.152) 
0.157 
(0.092) 
0.282 
(0.164) 
0.114 
(0.069) 
0.064 
(0.041) 
2.525* 
(1.044) 
45.92 
8.57 
6,632; 
2,998 
0.521* 
(0.219) 
-0.722* 
(0.296) 
0.597 
(0.235) 
0.481 
(0.260) 
0.349 
(0.249) 
0.286 
(0.190) 
0.069 
(0.078) 
0.058 
(0.161) 
0.188 
(0.116) 
0.267 
(0.168) 
0.118 
(0.072) 
0.062 
(0.041) 
0.607 
(0.257) 
0.400 
(0.202) 
0.375* 
(0.185) 
0.999 
(0.301) 
0.958 
(0.367) 
2.602* 
(1.136) 
72.07? 
6.68 
6,632; 
2,998 
* 
p < .05; 
? 
p < .01 ; 
?* 
p < .001 ; z-statistics are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Recommendation by the CEO was measured in the follow-up survey of directors 
who serve on nominating committees. Need for power and self-monitoring were measured in the second follow-up 
survey, described in the Appendix. 
tion (Baron and Kenny, 1986). As shown in model 1, when 
recommendation by the CEO is added to the model, the 
main effect of ingratiation and the interaction effects become 
non-significant. This result, together with the primary results 
discussed above, provides initial evidence for mediation. We 
then conducted the Sobel (1982) test of mediation, which 
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confirmed that recommendation by the CEO significantly 
mediates the effects of ingratiation on subsequent appoint 
ments at firms where the CEO serves as a director (ingratia 
tion toward the CEO increases the likelihood of receiving the 
CEO's recommendation for a board appointment at a particu 
lar company where the CEO serves as a director, which in 
turn increases the likelihood that the manager will actually 
receive an appointment at that firm). Analyses also confirmed 
that recommendation by the CEO mediates the effects of 
ingratiation on appointments at boards to which the CEO is 
indirectly connected. 
There is qualitative evidence that when CEO-directors are 
expected to resign from a board, they are often asked to rec 
ommend another top manager who could replace them 
(Demb and Neubauer, 1992). This raises the possibility that a 
CEO-director's expected departure from a board could influ 
ence the likelihood that his subordinate is appointed to that 
board. Thus, as noted above, we controlled for whether the 
CEO departed from the potential hiring board. Although this 
variable is significantly correlated with managers' appoint 
ments at boards on which the CEO serves as director, it is 
not a significant predictor of board appointments in the multi 
variate models. Separate analyses indicated that the correla 
tion between CEO departure from the potential hiring board 
and the dependent variable may be due to the joint influence 
of other variables in the model: when controls for the CEO's 
number of board appointments and possession of an elite 
undergraduate degree are added to the models, the effect of 
CEO departure from the potential hiring board becomes 
insignificant. Separate multivariate models also indicated that 
CEO departure from the potential hiring board does not sig 
nificantly moderate the effect of ingratiation toward the CEO 
on the likelihood of receiving an appointment. Thus, though it 
appears that CEOs do frequently leave a board relatively soon 
after recommending a subordinate manager for an appoint 
ment there, the CEO's departure (or the prospect of it) does 
not seem to be a significant determinant of the subordinate's 
appointment. 
Our premise that CEO-directors' recommendations can influ 
ence appointments on other boards to which the CEO-direc 
tor is indirectly connected was corroborated by qualitative 
evidence from our pre-test and descriptive evidence from our 
follow-up survey of CEOs. In the pre-test, several managers 
and directors suggested that when a CEO-director recom 
mends someone to the nominating committee, that name 
can spread through the board network as members of the 
nominating committee subsequently suggest the same per 
son as a possible director candidate on other boards on 
which they serve as an outside director. In the survey, we 
asked respondents to indicate whether it is common for 
CEO-directors to recommend individuals for board positions 
who were recommended and considered recently for 
appointments on other boards on which the CEO-director 
serves on the nominating committee. Eighty-nine percent of 
the responding CEOs (97 out of 109) agreed that such occur 
rences are fairly common or very common. Less than 5 per 
cent of respondents felt that such occurrences are rare. 
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We conducted further analyses to address the possibility that 
the apparent effect of ingratiation on board appointments is 
an artifact of certain personal attributes that may covary with 
ingratiation and that predict executive advancement in gener 
al. First, we conducted a supplementary analysis of appoint 
ments at other boards in the sample frame where the CEO 
was not a director and to which the CEO was not indirectly 
connected through a fellow CEO-director on the nominating 
committee. As shown in models 5 and 6 of table 3, ingratia 
tion toward the CEO does not significantly predict the likeli 
hood of gaining appointments at these other boards. These 
results suggest that the hypothesized effects of ingratiation 
are not an artifact of personal attributes that determine 
advancement in general. Second, in separate analyses, we 
controlled for survey measures of self-monitoring and the 
need for power, which have been shown to covary with 
ingratiatory behavior in prior research (Kumar and Beyerlein, 
1991). We developed these measures from a second follow 
up survey of top managers at 300 companies in the sample 
frame of Forbes 500 firms (the survey and measures of self 
monitoring and need for power are described in the Appen 
dix). As shown in models 2-5 of table 4, the hypotheses are 
still supported after these controls are included in the mod 
els. Finally, we ran separate analyses in which ingratiation 
was measured from CEOs' responses to the survey. The 
hypothesized results were largely unchanged and remained 
significant. 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the findings provided strong support for our theoreti 
cal perspective on how managers without elite social and 
educational credentials or demographic majority status can 
gain access to appointments on corporate boards. The first 
set of results showed that interpersonal influence behavior in 
the form of ingratiation tactics directed at CEOs increases 
the likelihood that managers will gain board appointments at 
companies where the CEO serves as a director and at boards 
to which the CEO is indirectly connected. Moreover, supple 
mentary analyses validated our interpretation of the results 
by demonstrating that CEOs' recommendations mediate the 
effect of ingratiation on board appointments. Ingratiation tac 
tics directed at the CEO increased the likelihood that the 
CEO would recommend the ingratiating manager for a board 
seat at a particular company, which in turn increased the like 
lihood that the manager would ultimately gain an appoint 
ment on the board of that firm or the board of another firm to 
which the CEO was indirectly connected. Further results 
showed that ingratiatory behavior is particularly valuable in 
gaining board appointments for managers who lack elite 
social and educational credentials, such as membership in an 
exclusive social club, an elite undergraduate degree, listing in 
the Social Register or attendance at an exclusive preparatory 
school, and for managers who lack demographic majority sta 
tus in the corporate elite (i.e., ethnic minorities and women). 
Our findings suggest that interpersonal influence behavior 
directed at individuals who control access to board positions 
provides an alternative pathway to the boardroom for corpo 
rate managers. A central proposition in the literature on cor 
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porate elites is that access to board appointments and other 
positions of power is restricted to some degree to individuals 
who are endowed with elite social and educational creden 
tials and who are demographically similar to incumbent mem 
bers of the power elite (i.e., male Caucasians) (Useem and 
Karabel, 1986). Yet, as several authors have acknowledged, 
although there is evidence that individuals who have elite cre 
dentials and demographic majority status are advantaged in 
obtaining board positions, a significant portion of managers 
who ascend to the boardroom lack such characteristics 
(Useem and Karabel, 1986; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998; 
Domhoff, 2002). Our findings provide one possible explana 
tion. In particular, it appears that interpersonal influence 
behavior in the form of ingratiation tactics directed at CEOs 
can partially substitute for the advantages of demographic 
majority status and elite social and educational credentials in 
gaining access to board appointments. Specific results indi 
cated that managers who engage in a relatively high level of 
ingratiation toward the CEO (one standard deviation above 
the mean) have the same or a better chance of gaining a 
board seat at another company where the CEO serves as a 
director or to which the CEO is indirectly connected as man 
agers who engage in average levels of ingratiation but pos 
sess elite social credentials or demographic majority status. 
The findings support our theoretical argument that interper 
sonal influence from ingratiation can substitute to some 
extent for the social capital provided by an upper class back 
ground, attendance at elite educational institutions, or mem 
bership in prestigious social clubs. It appears that managers 
who have social capital in the corporate elite from their social 
and educational background have less need for interpersonal 
influence from ingratiation in order to secure board appoint 
ments. Similarly, the findings support our theoretical argu 
ment that positive affect from ingratiatory behavior can sub 
stitute for similarity-attraction bias from demographic majority 
status in gaining CEOs' recommendations for board appoint 
ments. The findings are also consistent with our suggestion 
that displays of ingratiation toward the CEO may reduce 
uncertainty about the social fit on boards of managers who 
lack elite social and educational credentials or demographic 
majority status. There is considerable evidence that wide 
spread norms of director conduct tend to favor deferential 
behavior toward the CEO in the decision-making process. 
Given that ingratiation can be viewed as an act of submission 
or deference to another person (Jones, 1964; Shankar, 
Ansah, and Saxema, 1994; Vonk, 1998), ingratiation toward 
the CEO should tend to reduce uncertainty about a manag 
er's social fit on boards of large companies, enhancing the 
likelihood of receiving the CEO's recommendation for a board 
appointment. Several authors have suggested that elite cre 
dentials and demographic majority status create the pre 
sumption of social fit with corporate leaders (Kanter, 1977; 
Westphal and Milton, 2000; Domhoff, 2002), such that man 
agers who possess these characteristics may have less need 
to engage in displays of ingratiation to acquire board posi 
tions. 
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In one sense, our theoretical perspective and supportive 
results suggest that managers have some degree of personal 
control over their access to positions of power in the corpo 
rate elite. Managers who lack a privileged background or 
demographic majority status can overcome their lack of 
social endowments by engaging in a high level of interper 
sonal influence behavior toward individuals who control 
access to board positions. Thus, our findings suggest that 
individual agency plays an important role in gaining access to 
positions of power and privilege in U.S. companies. Never 
theless, macro-social factors may also help explain how eth 
nic minorities and women have gained access to board posi 
tions. In particular, external pressure from stakeholders to 
increase demographic diversity in corporate leadership may 
be partly responsible for the growing presence of women 
and ethnic minorities on corporate boards in recent years 
(Daily, Certo, and Dalton, 1999; Westphal and Milton, 2000). 
At the same time, our findings provide evidence of a fairly 
subtle form of social discrimination in the corporate elite (All 
port, 1954: 52; Otten and Mummendey, 1999), in that man 
agers who represent demographic minorities or who lack 
privileged backgrounds must engage in a higher level of 
ingratiatory behavior toward the CEO than those in the major 
ity to have the same chance of receiving the CEO's recom 
mendation for a board appointment. Contemporary theories 
of discrimination such as "aversive racism" suggest that 
although overt prejudice and discrimination have become less 
pronounced in U.S. organizations in recent years, relatively 
subtle, "covert" forms of discrimination may have persisted 
(Dovidio and Gaertner, 2000: 316; Crandall and Eshleman, 
2003). Systematic evidence for aversive racism and related 
forms of discrimination is limited primarily to experimental 
studies that show discrimination against ethnic minorities and 
women in simulated hiring decisions (Dovidio and Gaertner, 
2000). The present study is unique in providing fairly direct 
evidence of social discrimination in actual hiring decisions 
(i.e., appointments to corporate boards). Consistent with 
aversive racism and related theories of social discrimination, 
our findings suggest that while ethnic minorities and women 
who seek access to the highest level of the corporation may 
not come up against a "glass ceiling" per se, they also do 
not receive equal treatment or consideration in the director 
selection process. 
Our findings appear to have important implications for corpo 
rate governance. Outside directors have the potential to 
serve a critical role in corporate governance by actively chal 
lenging and controlling CEOs' decision making and behavior 
on behalf of stakeholders' interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Walsh and Seward, 1990; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). As dis 
cussed above, there is considerable evidence that outside 
directors, and especially manager-directors, tend to abide by 
social norms that lead them to defer to the CEO's judgment 
on strategic issues and generally respect the decision-making 
authority and autonomy of CEOs. The reluctance of outside 
directors to exercise control over management decision mak 
ing and behavior has been implicated in a variety of negative 
organizational outcomes, including strategic inertia in the face 
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of declining performance, ill-advised corporate acquisitions, 
accounting scandals and white-collar crime (for a review, see 
Chatterjee and Harrison, 2001). Norms of directors' deferring 
to top managers are typically attributed to high levels of 
social cohesion among the inner circle of corporate elites, 
which is thought to facilitate socialization of new directors 
and social control of deviant behavior (Domhoff, 1978, 2002; 
Palmer, 1987; Westphal and Khanna, 2003). Social cohesion 
of corporate elites, in turn, is thought to result from director 
selection processes that restrict entry into the corporate elite 
to demographically similar persons who share preexisting 
social ties, common attitudes and behavioral styles from joint 
membership in exclusive social clubs, attendance at the 
same elite educational institutions, and shared upper class 
origins. 
Yet there is evidence that norms of directors' deferring to 
managers have persisted despite an increase over time in the 
portion of board seats held by managers who lack elite cre 
dentials and/or demographic majority status. The present 
study suggests that such norms may persist in part because 
managers who act in a deferential or submissive manner 
toward CEOs are more likely to be recommended for board 
appointments. Moreover, our findings indicate that managers 
who contribute to the demographic diversity of the corporate 
elite (e.g., ethnic minorities, women, or persons who lack 
elite social or educational credentials) must typically engage 
in an especially high level of submissive or deferential behav 
ior toward the CEO in order to receive board appointments. 
Given that a majority of outside board members at large com 
panies are manager-directors, and manager-directors are 
known to exert more influence on boards than other directors 
(e.g., independent lawyers or academics) (Useem, 1984; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), it is perhaps not surprising 
that norms of passivity and deference toward top managers 
would persist despite an increase in the diversity of the cor 
porate elite. As shown in our supplementary analyses, man 
agers who engage in a relatively high level of ingratiatory 
behavior toward the CEO of their company also tend to 
engage in a high level of ingratiation toward the CEO at com 
panies where they are appointed as an outside director. 
Given evidence from our primary analyses that managers 
who display ingratiatory tendencies are strongly favored in 
the director-selection process, a change in board norms 
toward greater decision control by outside directors may 
require a significant change in prevailing selection processes. 
For instance, it may be necessary to require boards to select 
more non-managers for outside director positions and to rely 
less on CEO-directors for nominations. 
The findings of this study extend prior research by Westphal 
and colleagues that has examined how social psychological 
processes and micro-behavioral dynamics can have important 
effects on corporate governance. Westphal (1998) showed 
how social influence tactics enable CEOs to neutralize the 
effects of board reforms on corporate policy and strategy. 
The present study extends that research by showing that 
interpersonal influence processes are also important in deter 
mining who gains access to the inner circle of corporate 
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elites and in explaining persistent norms of director conduct. 
Our findings also extend research by Westphal and Milton 
(2000), which examined social determinants of minority influ 
ence on boards. The present study complements Westphal 
and Milton's findings by examining micro-social factors that 
determine how minorities gain access to boards in the first 
place. Moreover, both studies indicate that minorities gain 
influence by engaging in behaviors that neutralize out-group 
biases, including social influence tactics that highlight similar 
points of view between the minority actor and the influence 
target, whether the CEO or fellow directors. As discussed 
above, our findings also extend recent research by Westphal 
and Khanna (2003), which demonstrated widespread social 
norms of director deference to CEOs. Our theory and results 
suggest that such norms may result in part from selection 
factors that favor the appointment of deferential individuals 
to corporate boards. 
While our study examines how demographic characteristics 
moderate the consequences of ingratiation, contemporary 
perspectives on social influence suggest that the effects of 
ingratiation may depend on certain other characteristics of 
the influence target, the influence agent, and the organiza 
tional context (cf. Barry and Watson, 1996). A limitation of 
our theory is that it fails to take these contingency factors 
into account. For instance, certain personality attributes may 
moderate the effects of ingratiatory behavior. Influence 
agents who engage in high levels of self-monitoring may be 
more successful in their use of ingratiation than low self 
monitors (Liden and Mitchell, 1988; Turnley and Bolino, 
2001). Moreover, influence targets with an external locus of 
control may be more responsive to ingratiation than targets 
with an internal locus of control, because they tend to exhibit 
a greater need for social affirmation (Barry and Watson, 
1996). There is also some evidence that the status of the 
influence agent moderates the effectiveness of ingratiation 
(Gordon, 1996). Social influence theorists have also suggest 
ed that organizational culture could moderate the conse 
quences of ingratiation. That is, ingratiation tactics may be 
more effective in organizations where such behavior is nor 
matively accepted (Liden and Mitchell, 1988; Shankar, Ansah, 
and Saxema, 1994). But most prior research on contingency 
factors in social influence has focused on how individual dif 
ferences determine the choice of an influence tactic (e.g., 
Farmer and Maslyn, 1999; Bolino and Turnley, 2003; Cable 
and Judge, 2003). There is less work on how characteristics 
of the influence agent or target moderate the consequences 
of influence tactics, and there is very little research on how 
organizational characteristics moderate the use or conse 
quences of social influence behavior. Future research should 
examine how such factors moderate the determinants and 
consequences of social influence behavior by corporate 
elites. 
Some social influence theorists have suggested that ingratia 
tion may have a diminishing marginal utility to the influence 
agent, such that it yields small or even negative returns at 
very high levels (e.g., Jones and Wortman, 1973; Gordon, 
1996), but in separate analyses, we found no evidence for a 
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curvilinear effect of ingratiation on board appointments. The 
linear effect in this context may indicate that managers in our 
sample rarely engaged in excessively high levels of ingratia 
tion or that top managers of large companies are relatively 
skilled at ingratiation, compared with the typical subjects in 
laboratory experiments or lower-level employees. By virtue of 
selection factors and management experience, top managers 
may be better able to engage in high levels of ingratiation 
without eliciting negative reactions. Alternatively, experienced 
top managers may know when to "pull back" and avoid over 
the-top ingratiation. Evidence shows that high self-monitors 
realize greater benefits from ingratiation than low self-moni 
tors (Turnley and Bolino, 2001), and top managers of large 
companies are known to exhibit higher levels of self-monitor 
ing than lower-level employees (Zaccaro, Foti, and Kenny, 
1991). Future research could examine whether self-monitor 
ing, experience, or other factors enable top managers to 
engage in more skillful ingratiation or to avoid excessive 
ingratiation. 
Research could also extend our study by examining the use 
of other social influence tactics by top executives. For 
instance, managers may seek to influence CEOs' decision 
making regarding board appointments or other outcomes by 
displaying their skill and expertise, rather than (or in addition 
to) engaging in ingratiation. Such behavior can be viewed as 
an element of self-presentation (Godfrey, Jones, and Lord, 
1986), which we controlled for in this study. Although self 
presentation did not have a significant effect on board 
appointments in our analysis, future research should examine 
whether the effectiveness of this tactic depends on the sub 
tlety and skill with which it is used (Turnley and Bolino, 2001). 
More generally, the effectiveness of self-presentation, like 
the effectiveness of ingratiation, may depend to some extent 
on characteristics of the influence agent (manager), the influ 
ence target (CEO), and the organizational context (e.g., cul 
ture). 
On one level, our findings point to the importance of social 
capital in obtaining positions of power in the corporate world, 
given that informal recommendations from CEO-directors 
were shown to have a very strong effect on the likelihood of 
receiving board appointments. Our theory and results also 
suggest, however, that individuals can actively create or 
enhance their social capital by engaging in interpersonal influ 
ence behavior toward persons who control access to power 
ful positions. In this respect, our study may contribute to the 
larger literature on social capital, which has tended to treat 
social capital as exogenous and focused on its conse 
quences, giving less consideration to the behavioral process 
es by which social capital may be actively created, enhanced, 
or maintained (see Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
The results of this study also attest to the importance of 
social influence behavior, and ingratiatory behavior in particu 
lar, to career success and power in corporate America. Empir 
ical research on social influence processes has shown that 
ingratiatory behavior has a remarkably powerful effect on the 
allocation of rewards at lower levels of the organization, and 
our findings indicate that it is similarly powerful at the highest 
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levels. Ingratiation was the strongest predictor of board 
appointments in our models. Thus future research should 
examine how ingratiatory behavior affects the allocation of 
other rewards and privileges in top management teams and 
boards of directors, including compensation and perquisites, 
selection as the CEO's successor, and influence on strategy 
and policy. Such research may ultimately demonstrate that 
ingratiation and related forms of social influence are an 
important equalizing mechanism in organizations, giving a 
larger share of rewards and privileges to those who are 
otherwise socially disadvantaged in the corporate world. 
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APPENDIX: Validity of the Ingratiation Scale 
Beyond evidence for the interitem reliability and interrater reliability of the 
ingratiation scale, there is considerable additional evidence for the validity of 
this measure. The ingratiation scale developed by Kumar and Beyerlein 
(1991), which we adapted for the present study, has been used and validat 
ed extensively in prior research. For instance, it has been used in studies by 
Watt (1993), Aryee and Wyatt (1996), Orpen (1996), Wayne et al. (1997), 
Westphal (1998), and Colella and Varma (2001). The scale has been validated 
by several of these authors. Watt, Orpen, and Kumar and Beyerlein have pro 
vided particularly extensive validation of the scale. Orpen provided evidence 
of convergent validity of the scale, Watt and Kumar and Beyerlein provided 
evidence of test-retest reliability, Westphal (1998) provided evidence of inter 
rater reliability, and Kumar also provided evidence of split-half reliability and 
convergent and discriminant validity. All six studies noted above provided 
evidence of internal consistency of the scale. Moreover, Kumar showed that 
the scale is highly correlated with Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson's (1980) 
ingratiation subscale and a refined version of this scale (Schriesheim and 
Hinkin, 1990), which is perhaps the other most widely used survey measure 
of ingratiation. The advantage of Kumar's scale is that it was designed for 
use in organizational settings and has been extensively validated in the field. 
Watt (1993: 172) noted that "to date, [Kumar and Beyerlein's scale] is the 
only full-scale measure of ingratiatory behavior in organizational settings." 
We conducted a second follow-up survey of senior officers from 300 compa 
nies randomly selected from the sample frame of Forbes 500 large and mid 
sized U.S. companies. We sent the survey to the CEO and up to four senior 
officers from each firm for whom demographic data were available (when 
the firm had more than four senior officers, we randomly selected four). The 
questionnaire sent to senior officers included our ingratiation scale together 
with questions that asked the respondent to assess how submissive, defer 
ential, and ingratiatory each of the other top executives was toward the CEO 
("Over the prior twelve months, how deferential was this manager toward 
the CEO?," "... how submissive was this manager to the CEO in his/her 
relations to the CEO?," and "... to what extent did this manager engage in 
ingratiatory behavior toward the CEO?"). The CEO questionnaire also includ 
ed these questions, asking about the behavior of each senior officer. The 
response rate was 39 percent for top managers other than the CEO and 36 
percent for CEOs (N = 439 senior officers and 109 CEOs). K-S tests revealed 
no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents on any 
of the managers' demographic characteristics included in the models, includ 
ing the elite social and educational credentials. Using these data, we esti 
mated correlations between responses to the ingratiation scale (i.e., flattery, 
opinion conformity, and favor rendering assessed by the focal manager or 
CEO) and responses to questions about "ingratiatory behavior," "submis 
sive" behavior, and "deferential" behavior (i.e., as assessed by the CEO or 
another senior officer) for a large portion of managers in the sample frame 
(N = 596). There was a high correlation between the focal manager's score 
on the ingratiation scale and a colleague's assessment that the focal manag 
er (1) was "deferential" toward the CEO (r = .64), (2) was "submissive" to 
the CEO (r = .59), and (3) engaged in "ingratiatory behavior" toward the CEO 
(r = .67). Moreover, there was also a high correlation between managers' 
assessments of their colleagues' ingratiatory behavior toward the CEO and 
their assessment of (1) how deferential their colleagues were toward the 
CEO (r = .65) and (2) how submissive their colleagues were to the CEO (r = 
.61). In addition, when the questions about submissive, deferential, and 
ingratiatory behavior were included in the factor analysis with questions from 
our ingratiation scale, all items loaded on the same factor. These supplemen 
tary results further validate our measure of ingratiation by showing that top 
managers view the pattern of behaviors assessed by our survey scale (flat 
tery, opinion conformity, and favor rendering) as indicative of ingratiation. 
We also examined the correlation between ingratiation and controlling 
behavior. If ingratiation involves submission and deference, then we would 
expect a negative correlation between ingratiation toward the CEO and the 
tendency to exercise control over the CEO as an outside director. Our survey 
of directors who serve on board nominating committees included questions 
about the extent to which directors exercise control over the CEO's decision 
making. The five-item scale included questions about key elements of deci 
sion control as conceived by Fama and Jensen (1983), as well as general 
questions about the director's propensity to exert control over the CEO's 
decision making (e.g., "To what extent has [the director] exerted control over 
CEO decision making?"). There was a strong negative correlation between 
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scores for the decision control scale and our measure of ingratiation toward 
the CEO (r = -.51). 
Social influence theorists have suggested that certain personality attributes 
should be associated with high levels of ingratiatory behavior. In particular, 
theorists have proposed that self-monitoring and the need for power should 
predict the use of ingratiation tactics (Schlenker and Leary, 1982; Kumar and 
Beyerlein, 1991). Kumar and Beyerlein (1991) measured these personality 
attributes and showed that ingratiation items loaded on a different factor 
from the self-monitoring and need for power items, and the ingratiation mea 
sure was significantly and positively correlated with measures of self-moni 
toring and the need for power, as expected, providing further evidence for 
the construct validity of their ingratiation measure. To further validate the 
ingratiation scale, our follow-up survey of senior officers included a short 
ened version of Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) self-monitoring scale, which 
has been extensively validated in prior research (e.g., Mehra, Kilduff, and 
Brass, 2001), and Steers and Braunstein's (1976) need for power scale, 
which has also been extensively validated in prior work (Ruf and Chusmir, 
1991). Both scales showed acceptable interitem reliability, with alphas of .83 
and .85, respectively. Factor analysis with promax rotation showed that 
items loaded on different factors as expected: items from the same scale 
had loadings of .5 or greater on the same factor and less than .2 on other 
factors. The factor scores for self-monitoring and need for power were sig 
nificantly and positively correlated with our measure of ingratiation (r = .42 
and 
.38, respectively), thus replicating Kumar and Beyerlein's (1991) earlier 
analysis and further validating our measure. 
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